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u.s. Financial Reform: Historical Perspective
Speculation on whether the 99th Congress will
enact banking legislation has been running high
for the past year. It now appears that tax reform,
the federal deficit, and the trade deficit will take
precedence, but this does not mean that further
banking legislation and other reforms are not
needed.
Senator Jake Garn of Utah, commenting on the
possibility offurther banking legislation, stated
that the environment of crisis that propelled the
1980 Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
and the 1982 Garn-St Germain Depository Insti-
tutions Act into law is no longer present. The
fact that financial reform is not expected this
year because of the lack of a crisis is not unique
to the current period in our economic history.
The crisis-orientation of reform is clearly evident
from a review ofthe financial history ofthe u.s.
An outstanding example is the 1930-33 period
when over 10,000 banks failed. In response,
President Roosevelt called a national bank holi-
day in March 1933. Eventually, the financial
system was subjected to the most extensive
restructuring since the birth ofthe nation. The
structure of institutions, markets, and regulation
that emerged persisted until the late 1970s,
when a new crisis threatened the financial
system and generated another round of financial
reform that has yet to be completed.
This Letter places the current financial reform
process in a historical context by describing and
comparing the content and objectives ofthe
reforms ofthe 1930s with those ofthe 1980s.
The Great Depression profoundly affected our
economy, and only by understanding how it
influenced the financial system can we fully
understand the current reforms.
Financial reform in the 1930s
The reforms ofthe 1930s came in the wake of
what is regarded by many as the most serious
disruption offinancial and real economic acti-
vity ever experienced in the U.s. -the Great
Depression. These reforms established the struc-
ture of the financial system until the late 1970s,
and reflected a dramatic change in philosophy
away from a belief in an unregulated market
system. The reforms sought to establish a stable
financial system by restraining bank competition
and by significantly expanding federal super-
vision and regulation to banks and to other
financial institutions and markets. They also
strengthened and centralized Federal Reserve
control over money and credit.
This effort to establish a more stable financial
system had four main components. The first was
the effort to limit the scope for risk taking in the
interest of restraining what were perceived at the
time to be "unsound" banking practices. Regu-
lation Q and Q-type interest rate ceilings on
savings and time deposits limited banks' ability
to use explicit deposit pricing to compete. An
outright ban on banks paying interest on
demand deposits was also established. In addi-
tion, constraints on entry into banking and
restrictions on bank lending and investment
activities were imposed in the hope of fostering
safer banking practices. Nevertheless, whatever
the intent ofthese measures, their effect in many
instances tended to limit the amount of competi-
tion in banking.
Banks were the main focus ofthese restrictions
because oftheir dominant role in financial inter-
mediation, however, analogous restrictions were
placed on other institutions as theyexpanded after
World War II. Savings and loans (S&Ls), for
example, were notpermitted to offer checking
accounts, business loans, orconsumer loans,
although, at the same time, regulation did favor
thrifts by allowing them to pay a V4 percentage
pointmore on savings and small time deposits.
While portfolio restrictions on thrifts had other
objectives, such as supporting the housing indus-
try, theireffect in many instances was to limit
thrifts' competitive position especially relative to
the open market.
Second, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) was formed to insure the deposits of
banks and savings banks in an effort to restore
public confidence in the banking industry.
Federal deposit insurance was also established
for S&Ls at the same time. Third, the powers ofFRBSF
existing federal regulatory agencies were
expanded and several new regulatory agencies
were established to regulate and supervise
financial institutions and markets. These
agencies adopted many policies that, whatever
their intent, are viewed by many observers to
have limited competition. Fourth, the Federal
Reserve System was reorganized to give the
Board of Governors a larger role in System
decisionmaking. The Board's powers to control
money and credit also were enhanced.
To understand the focus ofthe reform effort, one
mustconsider the then-popular viewthat the
collapse ofthe banking system occurred because
banks had adopted risky loan and investment
strategies that made them susceptible to collapse
in the face ofany major adverse economic event.
In addition, bank competition for funds was
blamed for drivingupthe cost oftheir deposits.
As a result, the argument went, they became
involved in equity, bond, and real estate markets
to a degree far in excess ofthat prudent for
institutions whose deposits constituted the major
partofthe country's money supply. The reforms
ofthe 1930s were based on the idea that banks
played too importanta role in the economy to be
left unregulated, and that the free play ofcom-
petitive forces onlyencouraged banks to assume
a level ofrisk ultimately unsound for the financial
system and the economy.
The shift in attitude toward regulated financial
markets and limited competition was partofa
much broader shift in attitude aboutthe market
system and the role ofgovernment. After the
Great Depression, the market system was no
longerexpected automatically to achieve an effi-
cientallocation ofresources and full employ-
ment. Instead, skepticism toward marketsolutions
prevailed. The extensive increase in financial
regulation and supervision reflected in the finan-
ciallegislation ofthe 1930s was one ofthe
outcomes ofthis skepticism.
Emergence of a crisis in the late 19705
The financial system performed at a satisfactory
level until the mid-1960s when itbegan to show
signs that itwas incompatible with current
economic conditions. Ofthe many structural
problems that emerged, Regulation Q ceilings on
deposit rates and portfolio constraints on institu-
tions (primarily thrifts) that specialized in mort-
gage lending were especially important.
Regulation Q was extended to S&Ls and savings
banks in 1966 and encouraged substantial losses
ofdeposits from banks, S&Ls, savings banks, and
credit unions whenever market interest rates rose
significantly above Regulation Q ceilings.
Depositors shifted their funds to investments with
unregulated rates in what is referred to as "disin-
termediation." Since depository institutions were
the major suppliers ofconsumer and mortgage
credit, disintermediation also reduced the avail-
abilityofcredit for the household sector.
The thrift problem arose from the highly con-
strained nature ofthe portfolios of S&Ls and
savings banks. Because of regulation, tax incen-
tives, and tradition, thrifts allocated funds
primarily to long-term fixed-rate mortgages.
However, their sources offunds were becoming
increasingly short-term and market-sensitive as
interest rates rose and regulators authorized new
deposits not subject to Regulation Q to prevent
disintermediation. They found that their tradi-
tional strategy offinancing their holdings of
mortgages, which have long maturities, with
mainly very short-term deposits put them in a
difficult position when interest rates rose and
became more volatile.
Structural problems in the financial system were
first manifest in disintermediation and the thrift
problem. However, basic economic develop-
ments were also recognized as exacerbating
these problems. The upward trend in inflation
since the mid-1960s fostered financial innova-
tion as accompanying rising market interest
rates made Regulation Q ceilings increasingly
binding. These innovations in turn were seen by
many observers as making the Fed's job of
reining-in overlyexpansionary monetary
growth more difficult. By the end ofthe 1970s,
the structural problems in the financial system
and the monetary control problems ofthe
Federal Reserve were seen to be related and to
require a simultaneous solution.
Financial reform in the 19805
The crisis that started in late 1979 and early
1980was responsible for the latest period of
financial reform. Inflation rates ofalmost20
percent per year, accelerating prices for gold
and silveron speculative markets, declining
dollarvalues on foreign exchange markets, the
probable failure ofChryslerCorporation and
concerns about the fragility ofsome banks allcontributed to a mood ofpessimism that ironi-
cally coincided with the fiftieth anniversaryof
the beginning ofthe Great Depression. The
observance ofthat anniversary naturally invited
comparison ofthe state ofthe banking system in
the late 1970s with that in the 1930s.
Financial reform ensued on four fronts. First, the
Federal Reserve System announced newoper-
ating procedures in October 1979 thatwould
assist it in its longer-term strategy of lowering
money growth to rates thatwere compatible with
reasonable price stability. Second, the Federal
Reserve announced new measures ofthe mon-
etary aggregates that took into account the proli-
feration ofnewdeposit and other instruments
caused by financial innovation.
Third, the Deregulation and MonetaryControl
Act ofMarch 1980 introduced the most signifi-
cant structural changes in the financial system
since the reform legislation ofthe 1930s. The Act
expanded the sources offunds for all depository
institutions by authorizing nationwide NOW
accounts; itexpanded S&Ls' uses offunds by
authorizing consumer lending (up to 20 percent
ofassets); it allowed S&Ls to issue credit cards
and to provide trust and related fiduciary
services; it relaxed or removed state-imposed
usury limits on mortgage and other types ofcredit;
and, most importantly, the Actestablished a
mechanism to phase out Regulation Q ceilings
on savings and time deposits by March 1986. The
legislation also extended reserve requirements to
all depository institutionsthatoffered a reservable
deposit (transactions and nonpersonal time
deposits) in an effortto improve Federal Reserve
monetary control; allowed access to the discount
window for all depository institutions with
reservable deposits; extended access to Federal
Reserve services to all depository institutions;
and required the Fed to charge afee for mostof
those services. Fourth, the Garn-St Germain
Depository Institutions ActofOctober 1982 was
passed to address the plightofS&Ls and savings
banks. The 1982 Act authorized money market
deposit accounts (MMDAs), encouraged the
Deregulation Committeeto introduce Super-
NOWaccounts, further diversified the powers of
S&Ls, and settled the controversy overthe due-
on-sale clause in mortgage contracts.
These actions have made major changes in the
structure ofthe financial systemand the conduct
of monetary policy. Their benefits include: (1)
increased competition and, hence, greatereffi-
ciency in the transfer offunds between lenders
and borrowers; (2) greater equity forthe small
saver, who can nowearn market rates of interest;
(3) increased incentives to save to supporteco-
nomic growth; (4) a more stable financial system,
by ending periods ofdisintermediation and
improvingthe viabilityofthrifts; and (5) greater
monetary control bythe Federal Reserve.
The reform process ofthe 1980s may notyet be
complete. Many observers argue thatthere stiII
remain the needs to restructure deposit insur-
ance, to redefine geographic and product-line
restrictions on banks and otherfinancial institu-
tions, and to remove the zero ceiling on demand
deposits, as well as to permit nonbank banks to
issue demand deposits. But in the absence of
another crisis, the pace offurther financial reform
is uncertain.
The reformsofthe 1930sand 1980s
The reform periods ofthe 1930s and 1980s stand
out as majorchanges in the structure ofthe
financial system when viewed against the back-
ground ofthe entire financial historyofthe U.S.
There are important similarities and a major
difference worth keeping in mind.
Both reform periods were crisis-oriented,
although the more recent crisis was not as severe
as the Great Depression. Each was concerned
with enhancing the stabilityofthe financial
system and the soundness ofdepository institu-
tions, and with aiding monetary control. And
both represented extensive intervention by Con-
gress and federal regulators.
Despitethese similarities, there was a funda-
mental difference. The reforms ofthe 1980s were
designed to expand the degree ofcompetition in
the financial system and, in fact, to dismantle a
numberofthe key constraints established in the
1930s. Like the 1930s' reforms, the current
reforms are partofa broader change in phil-
osophy about the market system and the role of
government. But unlikethe earlier reforms, they
represent newfound faith in market solutions that
had been destroyed by the Great Depression.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 188,737 425 12,087 6.8
Loans and Leases1 6 170,989 337 14,453 9.2
Commercial and Industrial 52,939 189 5,598 11.8
Real estate 62,231 - 21 2,501 4.1
Loans to Individuals 32,752 35 5,703 21.0
Leases 5,285 10 273 5.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,699 115 - 1,496 - 12.3
Other Securities2 7,049 - 27 - 867 - 10.9
Total Deposits 194,266 1,980 8,553 4.6
Demand Deposits 44,863 1,228 1,525 3.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,852 1,001 786 2.3
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,576 799 1,110 8.9
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,827 - 47 5,922 4.5
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,895 112 3,371 8.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 38,909 - 262 860 2.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 18,708 -2,502 - 654 - 3.3
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change